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CRIMINOLOGY 
RECIDIVISM AND TIME SERVED IN 
PRISON† 
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AVINASH S. BHATI**** 
A justification for lengthier stays in prison stems from the belief that 
spending more time in prison reduces recidivism.  Extant studies, however, 
have provided limited evidence for that belief and, indeed, suggest the effect 
of time served may be minimal.  Few studies have employed rigorous 
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methodological approaches, examined time spans of more than one to two 
years, or investigated the potential for the relationship between recidivism 
and time served to be curvilinear.  Drawing on prior scholarship, this 
paper identifies three sets of hypotheses about the functional form of the 
time served and recidivism relationship.  Using generalized propensity 
score analysis to examine data on 90,423 inmates released from Florida 
prisons, we find three patterns: greater time served initially increases 
recidivism but then, after approximately one year, decreases it, and, after 
approximately two years, exerts no effect; estimation of the effects 
associated with durations of more than five years are uncertain.  The 
results point to potential criminogenic and beneficial effects of time served 
and underscore the need to identify how varying durations of incarceration 
affect recidivism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, the United States embarked on a seemingly 
straightforward approach to reducing recidivism among convicted felons: 
incarcerating more offenders and ensuring that they serve more time.1  The 
 
1  See EDWARD J. LATESSA ET AL., WHAT WORKS (AND DOESN’T) IN REDUCING 
RECIDIVISM 6–7 (2014) (describing the changes in the corrections system and the expanded 
use of incarceration and longer terms of incarceration over time); THE PEW CENTER ON THE 
STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 1 (2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencin
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logic in part has been that additional time in prison exacts greater 
retribution and creates appreciable incapacitation and deterrent effects.2  
The logic in part, too, has been that prison has a specific deterrent effect 
that reduces recidivism.  Scholars, however, have highlighted that the logic 
by which prison does, or does not, reduce recidivism may be more 
complicated.  On theoretical grounds, for example, it remains unclear 
exactly how specific deterrent effects of prison may unfold over varying 
periods of incarceration.3  The pains or strains of imprisonment,4 which 
could contribute to deterrent effects, may be more concentrated in or felt 
more acutely during early stages than later stages of incarceration.5  At the 
same time, varying durations of incarceration may exert different effects on 
social bonds, social capital, and labeling processes,6 and in turn, 
recidivism.7  Similarly, as Clemmer long ago emphasized in 1958, lengthier 
 
g_and_corrections/prisontimeservedpdf.pdf (stating that the punitive turn in American 
criminal justice led to lengthier prison terms); Francis T. Cullen et al., Prisons Do Not 
Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 50S–51S (2011) 
(finding that a prison term may have an unintentional criminogenic effect on future criminal 
involvement). See generally David Garland, Penality and the Penal State, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 
475 (2013) (explaining the emergence of punitive policies in America). 
2  See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
PRISONER REENTRY xix (2005); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and 
Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 15–16 (2011) 
(describing the rationale for the argument that imprisonment reduces recidivism); see 
generally Garland, supra note 1.  
3  See, e.g., David S. Abrams, How do we decide how long to incarcerate?, in EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, (Yun-chien Chang 
ed., 2014); Joshua C. Cochran et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Correctional Sanctions, 
30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 317, 318 (2014) (reviewing prior literature on the 
uncertain effects of variable amounts of time served in prison); Thomas Orsagh & Jong-
Rong Chen, The Effect of Time Served on Recidivism: An Interdisciplinary Theory, 4 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1988) (describing the time served-recidivism 
relationship). 
4  See ROBERT AGNEW, WHY DO CRIMINALS OFFEND? A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 
AND DELINQUENCY passim (2005); GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A 
STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 63 (1958). 
5  See generally Sheldon Ekland-Olson et al., Sanction Severity, Feedback, and 
Deterrence, in EVALUATING PERFORMANCE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 19 (Gordon P. 
Whitaker & Charles David Phillips eds., 1983) (discussing varying effects of incarceration 
and incarceration length for varying groups); Daniel P. Mears et al., Incarceration 
Heterogeneity and its Implications for Assessing the Effectiveness of Imprisonment on 
Recidivism, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 691 (2015). 
6   See generally Joseph Murray et al., Long-Term Effects of Conviction and 
Incarceration on Men in the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, in LABELING 
THEORY: EMPIRICAL TESTS 209 (David P. Farrington & Joseph Murray eds., 2014). 
7  G. Matthew Snodgrass et al., Does the Time Cause the Crime? An Examination of the 
Relationship Between Time Served and Reoffending in the Netherlands, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 
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stays in prison may allow for greater acclimation to prison culture and so a 
greater likelihood of offending after release to society.8 
Alongside these and other possibilities is the concern that time served 
may have little appreciable effect on recidivism.  Indeed, reviews and 
studies consistently suggest that, while mixed effects of time served in 
prison have been identified, overall the duration of incarceration likely 
exerts minimal influence on post-release offending.9  Few studies, however, 
have systematically examined prison durations of more than one or two 
years or investigated the functional form of the recidivism and time served 
relationship (i.e., whether the relationship is linear or curvilinear, and if the 
latter, what is the precise nature of the curvilinearity).10  In addition, studies 
of time served effects have been critiqued for employing weak 
methodological designs that undermine the estimates.11  Some of the 
problems include the use of small samples, limited to no inclusion of 
control variables to address potential confounding, attention only to the first 
year or two of incarceration, and estimation that allows only for 
identification of linear effects.12  These problems compound one another.13  
For example, a study that examines short prison stays cannot easily capture 
curvilinear functional forms that unfold when individuals experience longer 
prison stays, and cannot do so at all if such possibilities are not 
investigated.14  Similarly, limited sample sizes make it difficult to 
investigate functional form and simultaneously address confounding.15 
 
1149 passim (2011). 
8  DONALD CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY passim (Donald Clemmer ed., 2d ed. 
1958). 
9  See, e.g., Charles E. Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life Course? Evidence on 
Crime and Employment from a Natural Experiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 137 passim (2013); 
Thomas A. Loughran et al., Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship Between Length of 
Stay and Future Recidivism in Serious Juvenile Offenders, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700–02 
(2009) (studying reoffending among serious juvenile offenders who served varying amounts 
of time incarcerated); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & 
JUST. 115 passim (2009) (discussing differences in methods and analytic procedures used to 
assess the effects of a prison term on reoffending); Daniel S. Nagin & G. Matthew 
Snodgrass, The Effect of Incarceration on Re-Offending: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment in Pennsylvania, 29 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 601 passim (2013); Abrams, 
supra note 3; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7. 
10  Mears et al., supra note 5, passim. 
11  See, e.g., Loughran et al., supra note 9; Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 
supra note 9; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7.  
12  See Cochran et al., supra note 3, passim. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
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Against this backdrop, this study seeks to inform scholarship on 
punishment and, in particular, efforts to assess the effect of time served on 
recidivism.  Specifically, it investigates whether the relationship between 
time served and offending may be curvilinear (i.e., whether the magnitude 
of effect of time served on offending varies depending on the amount of 
time served).  To this end, the paper first situates the study’s relevance in 
the context of mass incarceration.  Second, it discusses prior scholarship on 
incarceration effects and time served effects on future offending.  Third, 
drawing on prior theory and research, we identify three sets of hypothesized 
relationships between time served and recidivism.  Fourth, we describe the 
data, which include information about 90,423 inmates who served varying 
lengths of time in Florida prisons, and the analyses, which rely on 
generalized propensity score modeling to address confounding and to 
estimate the functional form of the time served and recidivism relationship.  
Results of the analyses reveal a curvilinear relationship: greater time served 
initially increases recidivism but then, after approximately one year, 
decreases it, and, after approximately two years, exerts no effect; estimation 
of the effects associated with prison durations of more than five years are 
uncertain.16  The results assist in clarifying why some prior studies have 
reported mixed findings, including positive effects, negative effects, and 
null effects of time served on offending.17  They also underscore the need 
for greater attention to specifying and assessing the theoretical and 
empirical conditions under which incarceration and varying prison 
durations affect recidivism.18 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. GET-TOUGH CRIME POLICY AND THE ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 
The last several decades have been witness to a historically 
unprecedented policy shift that emphasized tougher, more punitive 
sanctioning of offenders, including greater use of incarceration and other 
types of correctional system punishments.19  State prison populations, for 
example, increased by over 700% from 1972 to 2011, as did time served in 
prison; inmates released in 2009 on average served nine more months in 
prison than did their counterparts in 1990.20  Many factors led to this 
 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  See Cochran et al., supra note 3, passim. 
19  TRAVIS, supra note 2; Garland, supra note 1. 
20  THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
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growth, including efforts to impose greater retribution for offending and to 
create incapacitation and general deterrent effects that would lower crime.21  
An additional factor was the belief that more time in prison would or could 
reduce recidivism and that the benefits of increased incarceration—whether 
through achieving such goals as greater retribution or reduced crime—
would outweigh social or economic costs.22  Other goals, such as the control 
of “dangerous classes” in American society, have been identified as well.23 
Even so, retribution and public safety constitute the avowed goals expressed 
by legislatures.24 
To date, the effects of the era of get-tough policy and of mass 
incarceration in particular, remain disputed.25  Scholars have emphasized 
that the greater reliance on incarceration can create a number of social 
harms.26  For example, prison stays may adversely affect ties to family and 
friends, mental and physical health, employment prospects, and the ability 
to access public housing.27  Scholars have also emphasized, the uncertainty 
that exists about the precise effects of incarceration on crime rates, whether 
through general deterrence, incapacitation, or other mechanisms.28  Not 
least, questions exist as well about whether incarceration reduces 
recidivism.29  For example, despite marked increases in incarceration in 
recent decades, there is no evidence that recidivism rates have improved.30  
 
21  See Marie Gottschalk, The Carceral State and the Politics of Punishment, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY passim (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks 
eds., 2013). See generally Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 2. 
22  See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 800–04 (2010) (discussing the role of 
the deterrence doctrine in punishment); Mears et al., supra note 5, at 705–07 (arguing that 
incarceration has heterogeneous effects). See generally Cullen et al., supra note 1. 
23  See Gottschalk, supra note 21, at 205; Garland, supra note 1, at 489.   
24  See generally JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND 
PRISONER REENTRY (2003); TRAVIS, supra note 2; Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 2.  
25  DANIEL P. MEARS & JOSHUA C. COCHRAN, PRISONER REENTRY IN THE ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION passim (2015). 
26  See id. 
27  See Christy A. Visher & Jeremy Travis, Life on the Outside: Returning Home after 
Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 102S, 110S–11S (2011); PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 105.  
28  See generally William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prisoner Expansion, in 
THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA passim (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2006); 
Garland, supra note 1; Paternoster, supra note 22. 
29  See generally William D. Bales & Alex R. Piquero, Assessing the Impact of 
Imprisonment on Recidivism, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 71, 97–98 (2012) (finding 
that using different methodologies to examine the effect of imprisonment on recidivism 
yields similar results); Cochran et al., supra note 3; Nagin et al., Imprisonment and 
Reoffending, supra note 9. 
30  See MEARS & COCHRAN, supra note 25, passim. 
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Recently, for instance, a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) national 
assessment of recidivism rates among prisoners released from thirty states 
in 2005 found that, within five years of release, 77% of prisoners were 
rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor, 55% were reconvicted of a 
new crime, and 28% were sent to prison for a new crime.31  The three-year 
levels of recidivism were nearly identical to those reported from a previous 
BJS assessment undertaken in 2002.32 
B. THE EFFECT OF INCARCERATION ON RECIDIVISM 
The theoretical foundation for anticipating that prison reduces 
recidivism rests on different lines of reasoning.  One is that individuals 
commit crime due to individual failings that can be remedied through 
rehabilitation.33  This perspective rests implicitly on a range of 
criminological theories of offending, such as general strain theory and 
social learning theory.34  Through various programs and interventions, 
rehabilitation seeks to change an individual in ways that decrease known or 
assumed causes of offending or that increase an individual’s ability to 
inhibit their effect.35 
A different explanation is that something about the experience of 
incarceration produces a specific deterrent effect.36  From a rational choice 
theoretical perspective, for example, it produces actual or perceived costs 
that offset potential crime benefits.37  The costs (e.g., loss of liberty, severed 
social ties, foregone employment income, stigma) and benefits (e.g., 
money, getting “high,” prestige) may vary, but the calculus—an assessment 
of costs relative to benefits—remains the same.38  Under a deterrence 
model, the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment are assumed to be 
related to punishment costs.39  Prison presumptively is assumed to 
constitute a severe punishment, even though the perceived severity of other 
 
31  MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS 
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 8, 15 (2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf. 
32  See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 passim (2002), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf 
(discussing the recidivism trends among a release cohort of ex-prisoners from a sample of 
fifteen states). 
33  See MEARS & COCHRAN, supra note 25, passim. 
34  See AGNEW, supra note 4; Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9.  
35  See generally LATESSA ET AL., supra note 1.   
36  Paternoster, supra note 22, passim. 
37  Id. at 782. 
38  See MEARS & COCHRAN, supra note 25. 
39  See id. 
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sanctions may be greater for some individuals.40  However, severity does 
not necessarily deter.  For example, the costs associated with incarceration, 
such as reduced employability and access to public housing, may decrease 
the benefits of non-offending to make recidivism upon release the more 
rational option.41  Perceptions about other aspects of incarceration, such as 
the experience of incarceration, prison conditions, or the extent to which 
actual time served in prison accords with sentence length may affect 
deterrence and thus offending.42 
Despite the substantial growth in incarceration and in scholarship on 
deterrence and rehabilitation in recent decades, “rigorous scientific 
knowledge [on the effect of imprisonment on reoffending] is in short 
supply.”43  Indeed, the problem is two-fold.  First, reviews of research have 
identified a mixed body of findings, with some finding beneficial effects, 
others finding harmful effects, and still others finding no effects on 
recidivism.44  Nagin’s review and recent studies lend support to the view 
that prison exerts a criminogenic effect.45  Even so, the bulk of studies taken 
as a whole suggest that incarceration effects on recidivism are at best 
uncertain or minimal.46  Indeed, the second and related problem consists of 
the weak methodological rigor of many prior empirical assessments.47  
 
40  See DAVID C. MAY & PETER B. WOOD, RANKING CORRECTIONAL PUNISHMENTS: 
VIEWS FROM OFFENDERS, PRACTITIONERS, AND THE PUBLIC passim (2010); Spelman, supra 
note 28. 
41  Paternoster, supra note 22, at 820. 
42  See Shawn D. Bushway & Emily G. Owens, Framing Punishment: Incarceration, 
Recommended Sentences, and Recidivism, J.L. & ECON. 301 passim (2013); M. Keith Chen 
& Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-
based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2007); Mears et al., supra note 5, at 697–98. 
43  Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9, at 116. 
44  See PAUL GENDREAU ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON SENTENCES ON RECIDIVISM 
passim (1999); PATRICE VILLETTAZ ET AL., THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, THE EFFECTS OF 
CUSTODIAL VS. NON-CUSTODIAL SENTENCES ON RE-OFFENDING: A SYSTEMIC REVIEW OF THE 
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE passim (2006) (reviewing literature about the effects of imprisonment 
on reoffending). 
45  See generally Avinash Singh Bhati & Alex R. Piquero, Estimating the Impact of 
Incarceration on Subsequent Offending Trajectories: Deterrent, Criminogenic, or Null 
Effect?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207 (2008) (describing the trajectories of future 
offending patterns among ex-prisoners); Bales & Piquero, supra note 29; Cochran et al., 
supra note 3; Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9. 
46  See Nagin & Snodgrass, The Effect of Incarceration on Re-Offending, supra note 9, at 
601; see e.g., Loeffler, supra note 9; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7. See generally Donald P. 
Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of 
Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 
passim (2010) (finding that incarceration has little net effect on the likelihood of future 
recidivism as measured by rearrest). 
47  See Mears et al., supra note 5, at 705–07. 
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Nagin found few studies that employed matching designs or adequately 
addressed potential confounding influences (for example, many studies 
failed to control for factors such as age, race, sex, or prior record).48 
C. THE EFFECT OF TIME SERVED ON RECIDIVISM 
Few studies have employed credible methodological assessments of 
the relationship between time served and recidivism.  In Imprisonment and 
Reoffending, the authors identified only two experimental studies and 
seventeen non-experimental studies of this relationship.49  The results 
across the studies were “quite varied,”50 with some indicating no effect of 
time served, others suggesting a potential recidivism-reducing effect, and 
still others suggesting that time served slightly increased recidivism.51  
Their assessment echoed that of prior reviews, which collectively suggest 
that time served may exert mixed effects and, most likely, a minimal effect 
on recidivism.52  For example, recent studies that employ methodologically 
rigorous analyses have found little effect of time served on reoffending 
among juveniles or adults.53  More broadly, reviews and research have 
raised a range of concerns. 
First, as emphasized forcefully by Nagin, with rare exception, non-
experimental studies have not employed a matching design capable of 
addressing confounding across dose levels.54  That is, they did not apply an 
approach that would ensure that across levels of time served, potential 
confounders are balanced.55  Research on incarceration effects has 
increasingly relied on more methodologically rigorous approaches, and 
several counterparts that focus on time served also exist.56  In general, 
however, the bulk of prior work has not, as Nagin and colleagues have 
noted, systematically addressed the confounding associated with different 
“dose” levels of time served.57 
 
48  Nagin et al, Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9, at 154–55.  
49  Id. at 167–69.  
50  Id. at 169. 
51  Id. at 175. 
52  See GENDREAU ET AL., supra note 44; VILLETTAZ ET AL., supra note 44. 
53  See, e.g., Benjamin Meade et al., Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship Between 
Time Served in Prison and Recidivism, 50 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 525 passim (2012); 
Green & Winik, supra note 46; Loughran et al., supra note 9; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7. 
54  See generally Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9.  
55  Id. at 177.  
56  See, e.g., Cochran et al., supra note 3; Green & Winik, supra note 46; Loeffler, supra 
note 9; Loughran et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., supra note 53; Nagin & Snodgrass, The 
Effect of Incarceration on Re-Offending, supra note 9. 
57  See Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9, at 167–77, 183. 
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Second, many studies examine short time-served durations (i.e., one to 
two years) and use either linear estimates or blocks of time (i.e., 1-year 
intervals) to contrast short or long stays and so cannot readily assess the 
functional form of the time served and recidivism relationship.  A failure to 
model such an effect can risk mis-estimating the true relationship and 
obscure different effects that arise at varying amounts of time served.  For 
instance, in a situation where relatively short prison stays decrease 
recidivism and longer stays increase it, a linear estimate—one that allows 
no variation in the functional form of the time served and recidivism 
relationship—might well yield a null finding as a result of the two effects 
counteracting one another.  Indeed, Orsagh and Chen have suggested that 
just such a U-shaped association exists.  Yet, recent studies suggest—but do 
not find statistically significant evidence—that instead an upside-down U-
shaped association exists.58  This issue assumes considerable importance 
given that conflicting linear estimates may stem from an averaging across 
negative and positive effects of time served.  For example, Gendreau found 
that studies that compared “more” incarceration (thirty months on average) 
versus “less” incarceration (thirteen months on average) identified 
estimated recidivism rates that were approximately 3% higher for the 
“more” incarceration groups.59  Had the studies allowed for precise 
estimation of nonlinear effects, they might have identified some durations 
of time served exerting a negative effect and other durations exerting a 
positive effect. 
The theoretical rationale for anticipating increasing, decreasing, or 
curvilinear effects of time served on recidivism in fact is varied and 
depends on assumptions about the timing of causal mechanisms, their 
intensity, and the number of them.60  For example, deterrent effects may be 
most likely in the initial months of incarceration; at that point the “pains of 
imprisonment” may be felt most acutely and criminogenic experiences that 
reduce social bonds or increase strain may be nominal.61  In addition, the 
marginal specific deterrent effect may decline with time because of “the 
general tendency of individuals to place relatively less value on 
experiences . . . that occur more distantly in time.”62  Viewed in this light, 
 
58  See generally Loughran et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., supra note 53; Orsagh & 
Chen, supra note 3. 
59  GENDREAU ET AL., supra note 44, at 9. 
60  See Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9, at 167–77; Paternoster, 
supra note 22, at 805–06; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7, at 1174. 
61  See generally Kenneth Adams, Adjusting to Prison Life, 16 CRIME & JUST. 275 passim 
(1992); SYKES, supra note 4. 
62  See Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3, at 158. 
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the initial months of incarceration may be associated with deterrent effects 
that offset countervailing criminogenic effects.  However, criminogenic 
experiences, including greater difficulty finding legitimate work, then may 
accumulate and increasingly offset deterrent effects of lengthier stays.63 
Orsagh and Chen interpret their results as indicating a U-shaped effect.  The 
identified regression models, however, have a largely linear, positive 
relationship between time served and recidivism.64  It is equally plausible 
that criminogenic effects begin immediately and escalate.  Clemmer, for 
example, long ago argued that short incarceration stays decrease the 
likelihood that individuals will acculturate to the “prison community” and 
that longer stays greatly increase it.65 
Alongside of theoretical reasons to anticipate curvilinear relationships 
are several empirical studies that suggest warrant for anticipating them.  
Loughran, for instance, investigated whether recidivism among a sample of 
serious juvenile offenders varied by length of stay in prison or length of 
time on probation, and found no statistically or substantively significant 
effect of either.66  Similarly, Meade used propensity score analyses to 
examine recidivism among inmates grouped into different time durations.67  
They found that the likelihood of recidivism increased slightly for the group 
of inmates who served 13–24 months (30%) as compared to those who 
served one year or less (27%), and that the likelihood of recidivism steadily 
declined thereafter.68  As the authors emphasized, however, only the decline 
in recidivism from one year or less (27%) to five years or more (14%) was 
statistically significant.69  In both studies, then, there is suggestive evidence 
of, but not strong statistical support for, a curvilinear association between 
time served and recidivism. 
Separately, Snodgrass examined time served effects among Dutch 
inmates and found no effect of time served on recidivism.70  Snodgrass 
employed a variety of methodologies and grouped inmates into six 
categories (one month or less, 1–2 months, on up to twelve months or 
more).71  Budd and Desmond found that sex offenders who served more 
time in prison were less likely to recidivate (the study did not examine 
 
63  See generally Orsagh & Chen, supra note 8; Paternoster, supra note 22. 
64  Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3, at 163. 
65  CLEMMER, supra note 8, at 300. 
66  See Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 723. 
67  See generally Meade et al., supra note 53. 
68  Id. at 538.  
69  Id. at 540.  
70  See Snodgrass et al., supra note 7, at 1172–75. 
71  Id. at 1158. 
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whether the relationship was curvilinear).72  In a study of first-time 
offenders in Nevada, Abrams reported negative effects of time served for 
inmates serving relatively short prison terms and no effect for inmates 
serving longer terms.73  In additional analyses using alternative modeling 
approaches, Abrams found no statistically significant effect of time 
served.74  He concluded: “The evidence seems to suggest that increasing 
sentences may reduce recidivism for short sentence lengths, but that the 
effect rapidly diminishes.”75  Green and Winik, in a study of drug 
defendants in Washington, D.C., found little evidence that randomly 
assigned months of time served in prison (or probation) reduced 
recidivism.76  Finally, Cochran found that longer versus shorter stays in 
prison were associated with a greater likelihood of recidivism as compared 
to being sentenced to jail.77 
Several of these recent studies are notable for examining the functional 
form of the time served and recidivism relationship.  However, the focus on 
relatively short time-served durations, juveniles, or smaller samples 
constrained the ability to estimate the functional form more precisely and 
robustly.  For example, many youths serve less than one year in prison, and 
comparing the first year of incarceration to a second year ignores the 
potential for nonlinear time served effects to surface within the first year 
after release.  Even so, these studies underscore that theoretical and 
empirical grounds exist for anticipating nonlinear effects of time served on 
recidivism. 
II. HYPOTHESES 
Although a central purpose of lengthier terms of incarceration is to 
reduce recidivism, prior theory and research suggest that time served may 
have positive effects, negative effects, or null effects.  These observations 
and scholarship point to three sets of possible relationships that may exist 
between time in prison and recidivism.  In each instance distinct variations 
may occur.  Each of the three sets of possibilities and the variations are 
discussed below in the form of hypotheses.  We present the different 
possibilities as hypotheses because, as prior scholarship indicates, the 
 
72  See, e.g., Kristen Budd & Scott A. Desmond, Sex Offenders and Sex Crime 
Recidivism: Investigating the Role of Sentence Length and Time Served, 58 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1481, 1493–96 (2014).  
73  See generally Abrams, supra note 3.  
74  Id. at 74.  
75  Id. 
76  See Green & Winik, supra note 46, at 381. 
77  See Cochran et al., supra note 3, at 340–41. 
5. MEARS 12/5/2016  12:50 PM 
2016] RECIDIVISM AND TIME SERVED IN PRISON 93 
specific anticipated relationship in each instance depends on theoretical 
assumptions about the experiences and psychological processes that occur 
during imprisonment.78 
H1.  TIME SERVED DECREASES RECIDIVISM 
H1a (linear decrease).  Greater time served will be associated with a 
linear decrease in the likelihood of recidivating.79  Under this assumed 
relationship, each month of incarceration provides a constant additional 
reduction in recidivism. Incarceration experiences, including perceived 
“pains of incarceration,” thus operate independently of experiences unique 
to the transition to or from prison and regardless of time already served.80 
H1b (decelerating decrease).  Greater time served will be associated 
with a lower likelihood of recidivism, but there will be diminishing returns 
associated with increasingly greater amounts of time served.81  Here, initial 
months of incarceration provide greater recidivism reductions than do later 
months of incarceration. This model accords with the idea that it is the 
transition to prison, and the realization of the deprivations that incarceration 
entails, that induces the greatest deterrent effect. Thereafter, individuals 
adapt to prison and develop coping strategies.82 
H1c (accelerating decrease).  Greater time served will be associated 
with a lower likelihood of recidivism, but there will be increasingly greater 
reductions in recidivism associated with more time served.83  That is, in 
contrast to hypothesis 1b, later months of incarceration reduce recidivism 
more so than do the early months.  Why?  One possibility is that inmates 
may view the initial months of imprisonment as more endurable.  As time 
progresses, they may become increasingly aware of and affected by the 
deprivations that they face.  Time served during these later months thus 
may provide a stronger deterrent effect. 
H2.  TIME SERVED INCREASES RECIDIVISM 
H2a (linear increase).  Greater time served will be associated with a 
linear increase in the likelihood of recidivating. Under this assumed 
 
78  See generally Bushway & Owens, supra note 42; Cochran et al., supra note 3; 
Loughran et al., supra note 9; Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9; 
Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3; Paternoster, supra note 22; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7.  
79  See Budd & Desmond, supra note 72, at 1493. 
80  See SYKES, supra note 4. 
81  See Abrams, supra note 3, at 63–91; Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 726; Meade et 
al., supra note 53, at 538; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7, at 1174. 
82  See Adams, supra note 61, at 285. 
83  Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3, at 158. 
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relationship, each additional month of incarceration provides the same 
increase in the probability of recidivism. As per hypothesis 1a, this model 
anticipates that each month in prison provides the same additive effect.  
Here, though, the effect is an increase in recidivism, presumptively due to 
increasingly greater exposure to criminogenic influences, such as increased 
strain, reductions in social bonds, additional opportunities to learn about or 
become committed to criminal activity, and more exposure to actual or 
perceived procedural injustice, in turn contributing to defiant behavior. 
H2b (decelerating increase).  Greater time served will be associated 
with a higher likelihood of recidivism, but there will be diminishing returns 
associated with more time served. In this scenario, the initial months of 
incarceration provide greater increases in recidivism than do later months. 
The logic is the converse of that for hypothesis 1b.  That is, the first part of 
a prison stay may be the most criminogenic for individuals; the severing of 
social bonds and the loss of social capital, for example, may be most likely 
to occur at this time. Subsequently, incarceration may exert a criminogenic 
effect on individuals, but to a lesser degree. 
H2c (accelerating increase).  Greater time served will be associated 
with a higher likelihood of recidivism, but there will be increasingly greater 
increases in recidivism associated with lengthier amounts of time served. 
Here, in contrast to hypothesis 2b, later months of incarceration provide 
greater increases in recidivism.  This model may arise through different 
possibilities.  For example, the initial period of incarceration may be 
primarily criminogenic, but there may be offsetting deterrent effects that 
mute the effect. However, after a period of time has passed, inmates may 
become more susceptible to criminogenic influences and be less deterred.  
A longer period of time in prison, for example, provides more opportunities 
to adopt or accept “criminal” labels, to associate with other criminals, and 
to become frustrated with perceived injustice. It also may lead some 
inmates to feel more shut out of their former social networks and to give up 
on the possibility of resuming a ‘normal’ lifestyle. 
H3.  TIME SERVED HAS A U-SHAPED ASSOCIATION WITH RECIDIVISM 
H3a (U-shaped effect).  In the initial period of incarceration, greater 
time served will decrease recidivism; subsequently, it will increase 
recidivism.  Put differently, time served will have a U-shaped association 
with the probability of reoffending.  As Orsagh and Chen have argued, 
rational choice theory suggests that “if the specific deterrent effect is 
positive, its marginal effect will decline with an increase in time served.  
This is based on the general tendency of individuals to place relatively less 
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value on experiences . . . that occur more distantly in time.”84  Lengthier 
prison stays, however, may result in adverse effects on employment and 
earnings that “counteract specific deterrence.”85  In addition, they may 
increasingly and adversely affect social bonds to family, friends, and 
community—in essence, they may sever these ties permanently—and social 
capital as well as create disruptions and strains that are criminogenic.86  
This model assumes that deterrent effects are greatest in the initial months 
of incarceration and that criminogenic effects are greatest, whether through 
an additive or interactive process, in the later months of incarceration. 
H3b (inverted U-shaped effect).  In the initial period of incarceration, 
greater time served will increase recidivism; subsequently, it will decrease 
recidivism. Recent studies have identified the potential for this inverted U-
shaped association between time served and reoffending to exist.87  The 
logic is similar to that for hypothesis 3a. However, the timing and relative 
strength of the intervening mechanisms change.  For example, disruptions 
to social bonds and social capital and the inducement of social strains may 
occur most profoundly in the early months of incarceration and exert a 
criminogenic influence that overwhelms any potential specific deterrent 
effect.  Subsequently, with these disruptions already in place, inmates adapt 
and, simultaneously, specific deterrent effects assume greater prominence 
and increasingly offset potential criminogenic effects of incarceration. In 
addition, rehabilitative programming is more likely to have occurred with 
sufficient intensity and duration to exert a beneficial effect.88 
To date, prior studies have been used to point to support for one or the 
other hypotheses.  However, few have directly examined the possibility that 
time served and recidivism may be associated in a curvilinear manner. One 
consequence of this situation is that many identified null effects of time 
served on recidivism may have masked countervailing U-shaped effects.89  
Some studies examine relatively short prison stays and so potentially 
capture only one aspect of the time served and recidivism relationships.90  
In addition, reviews and recent studies have highlighted that many extant 
empirical assessments of the time served and recidivism relationship have 
relied on weak research designs, such as using small samples and failing to 
 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  See Ekland-Olson et al., supra note 5, at 129.  
87  See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 3; Loughran et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., supra  
note 53. 
88  Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 727. 
89  See, e.g., Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3. 
90  See, e.g., Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 700–02.  
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address potential confounding.91  In short, how exactly time served is 
associated with the likelihood of recidivating remains largely unknown. 
H4.  TIME SERVED HAS NO EFFECT ON RECIDIVISM 
Several grounds exist for anticipating no effect of time served on 
recidivism.  First, research has identified mixed effects; some studies find 
that greater time served increases recidivism, others find that it decreases it, 
and still others find a null effect. The ‘true’ effect of time served, then, may 
lie in the middle—that is, it may have no consistently appreciable beneficial 
or harmful effect on recidivism.  Second, more recent and methodologically 
rigorous studies suggest that null effects are likely.92  Presumptively, based 
on prior reviews and recent studies, then, one might anticipate null effects 
to be the hypothesis most likely to be supported. 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
Data come from the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) 
Sentencing Guidelines database and include information on all imprisoned 
individuals who were convicted of felonies and released between 1994 and 
2002 (N = 90,423).  These data were matched to the FDOC’s Offender 
Based Information System (OBIS), which provides information on inmate 
prior records, release dates, and recidivism.93  The measures for the study 
are described below and in table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (N=90,423) 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Outcome: Reconviction within  
3 years (1/0) .47 .50 0 1 
Treatment: Time served  
(no. of months) 23.97 16.00 1 106 
Male (1/0) .92 .28 0 1 
White (1/0) .38 .49 0 1 
Black (1/0) .56 .50 0 1 
Latino (1/0) .06 .24 0 1 
Age (years) 32.63 9.63 13 90 
 
91  See, e.g., GENDREAU ET AL., supra note 44; Abrams, supra note 3; Green & Winik, 
supra note 46; Meade et al., supra note 53; Nagin et. al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 
supra note 9. 
92  See, e.g., Green & Winik, supra note 46; Loughran et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., 
supra note 53; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7. 
93  See Bales & Piquero, supra note 29, passim. 
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Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Primary offense (PO)–murder (1/0) .02 .13 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–sex crime (1/0) .04 .19 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–robbery (1/0) .08 .28 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–other violent (1/0) .16 .37 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–burglary (1/0) .18 .39 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–property (1/0) .14 .34 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–weapons (1/0) .03 .18 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–drug (1/0) .28 .45 0 1 
Primary offense (PO)–other (1/0) .07 .26 0 1 
Prior convictions (PC)–violent (count) .26 .79 0 13 
Prior convictions (PC)–sex crime (count) .03 .29 0 33 
Prior convictions (PC)–property (count) .84 2.70 0 103 
Prior convictions (PC)–drug (count) .44 1.42 0 69 
Prior convictions (PC)–other (count) .15 .55 0 19 
Prior prison commitments (count) 1.25 1.59 0 12 
Prior supervision violations (count) 1.38 1.45 0 11 
Offense severity score (continuous) 37.24 22.23 4 116 
Prior record score (continuous) 17.24 18.19 0 653 
Year–1994 (1/0) .07 .26 0 1 
Year–1995 (1/0) .13 .33 0 1 
Year–1996 (1/0) .13 .34 0 1 
Year–1997 (1/0) .14 .35 0 1 
Year–1998 (1/0) .14 .35 0 1 
Year–1999 (1/0) .15 .36 0 1 
Year–2000 (1/0) .14 .34 0 1 
Year–2001 (1/0) .08 .27 0 1 
Year–2002 (1/0) .01 .11 0 1 
Judicial circuit 1 (1/0) .04 .20 0 1 
Judicial circuit 2 (1/0) .03 .16 0 1 
Judicial circuit 3 (1/0) .01 .11 0 1 
Judicial circuit 4 (1/0) .07 .26 0 1 
Judicial circuit 5 (1/0) .04 .20 0 1 
Judicial circuit 6 (1/0) .10 .30 0 1 
Judicial circuit 7 (1/0) .04 .20 0 1 
Judicial circuit 8 (1/0) .03 .16 0 1 
Judicial circuit 9 (1/0) .07 .25 0 1 
Judicial circuit 10 (1/0) .05 .22 0 1 
Judicial circuit 11 (1/0) .07 .26 0 1 
Judicial circuit 12 (1/0) .03 .17 0 1 
Judicial circuit 13 (1/0) .09 .28 0 1 
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Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Judicial circuit 14 (1/0) .03 .17 0 1 
Judicial circuit 15 (1/0) .05 .21 0 1 
Judicial circuit 16 (1/0) .01 .08 0 1 
Judicial circuit 17 (1/0) .15 .35 0 1 
Judicial circuit 18 (1/0) .03 .18 0 1 
Judicial circuit 19 (1/0) .03 .18 0 1 
Judicial circuit 20 (1/0) .03 .17 0 1 
 
The main dependent variable for this study is recidivism, measured as 
the first felony conviction for a new offense within three years after prison 
release. For this measure, the date on which the offense occurred serves as 
the date of recidivism. Use of conviction necessitated reliance on statewide 
court data on felony convictions. Consistent with national estimates, 47% of 
the sample was reconvicted within three years of release.94  In some studies, 
reconviction may be problematic as a measure of recidivism because it may 
miss the fact that some ex-prisoners may violate conditions of parole and be 
re-incarcerated. That, in turn, would result in a form of censoring that 
would make it appear that an individual had not recidivated when in fact 
that had violated conditions of parole.95  This issue is not problematic for 
the present study because in Florida, the legislature abolished parole in 
1983.96  Accordingly, in our sample, which used a release cohort from 
1994–2002, substantially fewer than one percent of inmates were released 
to parole. 
A focus on felony conviction ensures that more serious offending is 
examined and reduces, but does not eliminate, some of the problems 
associated with using arrest, such as the greater likelihood that recidivism in 
such instances includes situations where no offense occurred or measures 
both reoffending and differential police responses.97  Additionally, it is 
consistent with the bulk of studies that examine recidivism, which as a 
Campbell Collaboration review highlighted, that typically operationalize 
recidivism using reconviction.98  Although ideally it would be possible to 
replicate the analyses using re-arrest, these data were not available for this 
 
94  See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 31, at 8. 
95  See Michael Ostermann et al., How Different Operationalizations of Recidivism 
Impact Conclusions of Effectiveness of Parole Supervision, 52 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 771, 
776 (2015) (finding that parole violators may be reincarcerated without being reconvicted). 
96  Bales & Piquero, supra note 29. 
97  See MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM passim (1984) (describing the various ways to 
conceptualize, operationalize, and measure reoffending).   
98  See VILLETTAZ ET AL., supra note 44.   
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study.  Even so, little evidence exists to suggest that the estimated effects of 
time served vary depending on the measure of recidivism.99  Use of a three-
year post-release observation window ensures that the analyses do not focus 
primarily on individuals likely to fail immediately upon reentry.100 
Given the study’s focus, the independent variable is time served, 
measured in months. The average time served was twenty-four months and 
the range was 1 month to 106 months. Only prison time, not jail time, was 
counted. Accordingly, for all inmates, the time served measure 
underestimates total time served but should not influence the estimated 
effect of time served on recidivism. 
For the analyses, matching covariates were included to address 
potential confounding that might bias the estimated time-served effect. The 
study includes confounders that prior work and reviews have identified.101  
These include: sex (male, female); race and ethnicity (non-Latino white, 
non-Latino black, Latino); age (measured in years); primary offense type 
(murder, sex crime, robbery, other violent, burglary, property, weapons, 
drug, other); prior conviction counts, by offense type (violent, sex crime, 
property, drug, other); prior prison commitments (count); prior supervision 
violations (count); an offense severity score created by the FDOC using 
their OBIS database (lower scores indicate less serious crimes and higher 
scores indicate more serious crimes); a prior record score, also created by 
the FDOC, that uses the Guidelines data and that counts all prior violations, 
felonies, and classifications as violent career criminal or habitual offender 
(lower scores indicate a more serious prior record and higher scores indicate 
a less serious prior record); the year of release from prison (measured using 
dummy variables); and the judicial circuit in which inmates were sentenced 
(measured using dummy variables). This last measure was included because 
cases are clustered in circuit courts. By including dummy variables in the 
statistical model, the non-independence of nested observations can be 
addressed. It was included as well because judicial circuit may be an 
important matching measure if there is important variation in, for example, 
the average length of sentences in circuits or in the types of experiences 
offenders have with the court system in a given judicial circuit, which may 
affect both the amount of time served in prison and the likelihood of 
recidivism upon release. 
One of the central challenges in assessing the effect of time served, or 
 
99  See Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 726. 
100  See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 31, at 8.  See generally Cochran et al., supra note 3. 
101  See generally GENDREAU ET AL., supra note 44; Abrams, supra note 3; Meade et al., 
supra note 53; Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9; Snodgrass et al., 
supra note 7. 
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the “dose” of imprisonment, is the fact that confounding may be unevenly 
distributed across dose levels; as with an experiment, there ideally is 
balance on covariates across these levels.102  An approach is needed that can 
address this situation and, simultaneously, allows for estimation of a 
nonlinear relationship between time served and recidivism.103 
Accordingly, we employ generalized propensity score (GPS) modeling 
using Stata’s doseresponse.ado package.104  GPS analyses extend the logic 
of propensity score matching (PSM) to a dose-response context in which 
the treatment is continuous rather than binary.105  The steps, discussed 
below, include: (1) estimating the generalized propensity score; (2) 
assessing balance on covariates across dose levels; and (3) generating the 
dose-response curve and standard errors via bootstrapping.106  A central 
advantage of using GPS is that it allows for more systematic adjustment for 
observed confounding and for estimation of diverse functional forms.107 
IV. FINDINGS 
In the first step of the analyses, we estimated the conditional 
distribution of time served given the matching covariates in table 1.  The 
prediction model, shown in table 2, was estimated using ordinary least 
squares regression and the natural log of time served as the dependent 
variable to satisfy the normality assumption.108  As inspection of the table 
highlights, many factors are associated, as anticipated, with serving more 
time. Males, blacks, and older inmates, on average, serve lengthier prison 
 
102  See Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9, at 177.  
103  See generally Abrams, supra note 3; Loughran et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., 
supra note 53; Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3. 
104  See, e.g., Michela Bia & Alessandra Mattei, A Stata Package for the Estimation of 
the Dose-Response Function Through Adjustment for the Generalized Propensity Score, 8 
STATA J. 354 passim (2008). 
105  Id. 
106 See generally Keisuke Hirano & Guido W. Imbens, The Propensity Score with 
Continuous Treatments, in APPLIED BAYESIAN MODELING AND CAUSAL INFERENCE FROM 
INCOMPLETE DATA PERSPECTIVES 73 passim (Andrew Gelman & Xiao-Li Meng eds., 2004); 
Sascha O. Becker et al., Too Much of a Good Thing? On the Growth Effects of the EU’s 
Regional Policy, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 648 passim (2012); Jochen Kluve et al., Evaluating 
Continuous Training Programmes by Using the Generalized Propensity Score, 175 J. ROYAL 
STAT. SOC’Y 587, 594–600 (2012); Anke Ramakers et al., Imprisonment Length and Post-
Prison Employment Prospects, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 399, 409–19 (2014); Michela Bia et al., A 
Stata Package For The Application Of Semiparametric Estimators Of Dose-Response 
Functions (CEPS/INSTEAD, Working Paper No. 2013-07, 2013); Bia & Mattei, supra note 
104.  
107  Bia & Mattei, supra note 104; Bia et al., supra note 106, passim. 
108  Bia & Mattei, supra note 104, at 357. 
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terms, and so, too, do murderers, sex offenders, and other violent offenders.  
Prior convictions (but not prior commitments) and higher offense severity 
scores and prior record scores were positively associated with time served.  
Sentence length was not included because of co-linearity problems. All of 
the identified effects held net of controls for release year and circuit court. 
Collectively, they explain approximately 31% of the variation in time 
served. Studies of time-served effects on recidivism typically have not 
included estimate of the extent to which independent variables predict time 
served, in part because the modeling typically has not employed a 
propensity score analysis approach; instead time served is included along 
with control variables to predict recidivism.  The variance explained in time 
served is lower than what is found in some studies of sentence length but is 
on par with that found in others and is substantially greater than some 
studies of time served.109  As emphasized below, unobserved confounding 
may exist and influence the estimated effects. 
 
Table 2.  Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Logged  
Time Served on Matching Covariates 
 
 B    S.E. 
Male (1/0) .039*** (.007) 
Black (1/0)a .021*** (.004) 
Latino (1/0)a .016 (.009) 
Age (years) .003*** (.000) 
Primary offense (PO)–murder (1/0)b .396*** (.016) 
Primary offense (PO)–sex crime (1/0)b .154*** (.012) 
Primary offense (PO)–robbery (1/0)b .112*** (.009) 
Primary offense (PO)–other violent (1/0)b .090*** (.006) 
Primary offense (PO)–burglary (1/0)b .075*** (.006) 
Primary offense (PO)–property (1/0)b .081*** (.007) 
Primary offense (PO)–weapons (1/0)b .093*** (.011) 
Primary offense (PO)–other (1/0)b .048*** (.008) 
Prior convictions (PC)–violent (count) .019*** (.003) 
Prior convictions (PC)–sex crime (count) .038*** (.007) 
 
109  See, e.g., Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. Gainey, Modeling the Effects of Legally 
Relevant and Extralegal Factors Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed, 
38 CRIMINOLOGY 1207, 1217 (2000); Evelyn J. Patterson, Hidden Disparities: Decomposing 
Inequalities in Time Served in California, 1985-2009, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 467, 478 
(2015); Brent L. Smith & Kelly R. Damphousse, Terrorism, Politics, and Punishment: A 
Test of Structural-Contextual Theory and the ‘Liberation Hypothesis’, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 67, 
77 (1998). 
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 B    S.E. 
Prior convictions (PC)–property (count) .013*** (.001) 
Prior convictions (PC)–drug (count) .017*** (.001) 
Prior convictions (PC)–other (count) .006 (.004) 
Prior prison commitments (count) .010 (.002) 
Prior supervision violations (count) -.001*** (.002) 
Offense severity score (continuous) .010*** (.000) 
Prior record score (continuous) .008*** (.000) 
Year dummy variablesc —— —— 
Judicial circuit dummy variablesc —— —— 
Constant 2.449*** (.022) 
   
R-squared = .310   
*** p < .001 
a.  “White” serves as the reference category. 
b.  “Primary offense (PO)–drugs” serves as the reference category. 
c.  Year and judicial circuit dummy variables were included in the model but are 
not shown here to conserve space (coefficient and standard error estimates 
available upon request). 
 
In studies that examine binary treatments, the propensity score is 
defined as the conditional probability of being in the treatment or control 
group.110  Similarly, the generalized propensity score is defined as the 
conditional probability of receiving the dosage actually received.111  The 
binary treatment case propensity score for an individual in the treatment 
group is computed as the conditional (on balancing attributes) probability of 
being in the treatment group; the propensity score for an individual in the 
control group is computed as the conditional probability of being in the 
control group.112  This logic extends to continuous treatments.113  For 
example, the generalized propensity score for an individual serving seven 
months in prison is computed as the conditional (on balancing attributes) 
probability of serving seven months in prison, based on the estimated 
model.  The difference with GPS analyses as compared to PSM analyses is 
that the focus centers on a continuum of possible groups, in this case, 
different levels of time served. 
 
110  Peter C. Austin, An Introduction of Propensity Score Methods for Reducing the 
Effects of Confounding in Observational Studies, 46 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 399, 402 
(2011). 
111  Bia & Mattei, supra note 104, at 357. 
112  Austin, supra note 110, at 402–03. 
113  See generally Bia & Mattei, supra note 104. 
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Central to GPS analyses is assessment of covariate balance across 
treatment levels or, in this study, amounts of time served. The end goal is to 
estimate the effect of treatment by addressing confounding across various 
levels of treatment. Following the GPS procedure detailed in Hirano and 
Imbens, propensity scores were created using the GPS equation and the 
parameter estimates from the model in table 2, as implemented in Stata’s 
gpscore.ado program.114  Kluve has emphasized that “the GPS has a 
balancing property that is similar to the balancing property of the propensity 
score in binary treatments.”115  The main assumption underlying the 
approach is that treatment level assignment is “weakly un-confounded 
given [a] set of observable variables.”116  This assumption, when “combined 
with the balancing score property, implies that assignment to treatment is 
weakly un-confounded given the GPS.”117 
In short, the GPS allows for removal of potential bias if the covariates 
are balanced across levels of treatment.118  Accordingly, following 
recommendations by Hirano and Imbens, we created four equal-sized time-
served intervals.119  We then compared the covariate means for each group 
with those of the other three after balancing the covariates using the GPS 
adjustment.  The resulting post-matching t-test comparisons are presented 
in table 3. 
  
 
114  See generally Bia & Mattei, supra note 104; Hirano & Imbens, supra note 106, at 73. 
115  Kluve et al., supra note 106, at 596. 
116  See Bia et al., supra note 106, at 3. 
117  See id. at 4. 
118  Becker et al., supra note 106, at 665. 
119  See generally Hirano & Imbens, supra note 106. 
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Table 3.  Covariate Balance Statistics Before and After Adjustment by 


























Male .03 15.72 .01 4.04 -72.2 .91 
White .00 .12 .00 -.42 -513.1 -.18 
Black -.01 -2.80 .00 -.56 -77.0 -.24 
Latino .01 5.66 .01 2.84 -41.3 .59 
Age .32 4.36 -.02 -.26 -106.8 -.03 
PO-murder .02 19.02 .01 9.53 -34.1 1.19 
PO-sex .03 19.73 .01 7.86 -49.4 1.45 
PO-robbery .05 23.11 .02 7.47 -60.1 1.92 
PO-other viol .03 11.51 .01 1.55 -84.1 .50 
PO-burglary .05 18.75 .01 2.57 -83.7 .88 
PO-property -.06 -22.52 -.02 -8.57 -59.5 -2.35 
PO-weapon .00 2.10 .00 -3.04 -268.9 -.49 
PO-drug -.10 -29.50 -.02 -5.47 -80.4 -1.93 
PO-other -.03 -13.56 -.01 -5.48 -56.1 -1.17 
PC-violent .10 16.43 .05 6.97 -48.3 .42 
PC-sex  .02 10.84 .01 5.18 -38.5 .18 
PC-property .31 15.47 .16 6.51 -47.3 .34 
PC-drug .07 6.28 .04 3.45 -34.1 .30 
PC-other .02 5.55 .01 2.60 -45.2 .14 
Pr commit .11 9.07 .03 1.87 -75.9 .24 
Pr violations -.12 -11.11 -.01 -.85 -91.4 -.09 
Off sev score 11.72 72.12 5.03 27.92 -57.1 4.49 
Pr rec score 4.23 31.12 2.46 14.64 -41.9 .41 
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Table 3.  Covariate Balance Statistics Before and After Adjustment by 


























Male .01 3.93 .01 2.39 -37.8 .53 
White .00 -.56 -.01 -2.11 297.2 -.84 
Black .00 .48 .01 3.03 563.0 1.23 
Latino .00 .15 .00 -1.00 -813.8 -.19 
Age .46 6.08 .36 4.59 -20.7 .53 
PO-murder .01 14.75 .01 9.12 -28.1 1.05 
PO-sex .02 11.45 .01 4.93 -52.0 .83 
PO-robbery .03 14.92 .02 8.83 -35.8 2.08 
PO-other viol .01 3.39 .01 1.98 -38.9 .59 
PO-burglary .02 7.01 .01 2.38 -64.3 .76 
PO-property -.02 -7.85 -.01 -4.10 -47.7 -1.10 
PO-weapon .00 -.77 .00 1.44 -288.7 .21 
PO-drug -.05 -14.66 -.01 -2.34 -84.3 -.80 
PO-other -.02 -10.55 -.02 -9.12 -12.0 -1.90 
PC-violent .06 9.61 .04 6.02 -32.4 .50 
PC-sex  .01 5.09 .01 2.38 -46.7 .10 
PC-property .14 6.60 .07 2.93 -50.9 .10 
PC-drug -.01 -1.05 -.02 -1.93 95.9 -.10 
PC-other .00 .19 .00 -.81 -540.8 -.05 
Pr commit .05 3.81 -.03 -2.24 -154.9 -.22 
Pr violations -.09 -7.62 .08 5.95 -189.5 .86 
Off sev score 6.49 37.64 3.79 22.21 -41.6 3.39 
Pr rec score 1.80 12.64 1.63 10.43 -9.2 .93 
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Table 3.  Covariate Balance Statistics Before and After Adjustment by 


























Male -.01 -3.02 .00 .28 -109.8 .06 
White .00 .89 .00 .84 -3.5 .32 
Black .00 -.13 -.01 -1.50 1116.1 -.59 
Latino .00 -1.58 .00 -.67 -56.7 -.12 
Age .22 3.03 .46 6.03 103.5 .61 
PO-murder .01 6.97 .00 4.41 -32.3 .46 
PO-sex .00 .41 .01 3.71 791.3 .55 
PO-robbery .01 4.97 .02 7.87 58.6 1.68 
PO-other viol -.02 -5.44 .00 -1.36 -75.0 -.38 
PO-burglary -.02 -6.10 .00 .70 -111.3 .20 
PO-property .01 3.79 .00 -1.45 -139.9 -.40 
PO-weapon -.01 -3.81 .00 -2.27 -40.5 -.32 
PO-drug .01 1.48 .01 2.22 55.0 .79 
PO-other .01 2.80 .00 .53 -80.0 .11 
PC-violent -.03 -4.50 -.01 -1.88 -57.8 -.09 
PC-sex  .00 1.48 .00 1.82 29.8 .05 
PC-property .01 .41 .05 2.53 529.0 .09 
PC-drug -.05 -4.31 -.03 -2.59 -39.4 -.11 
PC-other -.01 -2.18 -.01 -1.16 -45.5 -.03 
Pr commit -.07 -5.67 -.03 -2.79 -50.1 -.29 
Pr violations -.03 -2.58 -.05 -4.43 76.3 -.46 
Off sev score -.95 -5.56 1.03 6.02 -208.0 .92 
Pr rec score -5.56 -11.52 -1.11 -7.73 -80.0 -.49 
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Table 3.  Covariate Balance Statistics Before and After Adjustment by 


























Male -.04 -16.96 -.02 -7.26 -42.5 -2.07 
White .00 -.47 .01 2.60 -787.6 1.20 
Black .01 2.52 -.01 -2.26 -215.4 -1.11 
Latino -.01 -4.36 .00 -.57 -83.5 -.13 
Age -1.00 -13.50 -.08 -.84 -92.1 -.12 
PO-murder -.04 -41.30 .00 -.60 -98.6 -.06 
PO-sex -.05 -32.03 .00 .45 -101.5 .07 
PO-robbery -.09 -43.71 -.01 -4.34 -88.8 -1.03 
PO-other viol -.03 -9.68 -.02 -6.12 -20.6 -2.16 
PO-burglary -.06 -20.01 -.02 -4.33 -73.8 -1.55 
PO-property .07 27.05 .00 .34 -98.3 .12 
PO-weapon .00 2.42 -.01 -6.85 -474.0 -1.27 
PO-drug .15 43.46 .04 8.35 -74.6 3.75 
PO-other .04 21.51 .02 8.01 -49.5 2.19 
PC-violent -.13 -21.82 .00 -.26 -98.6 -.01 
PC-sex  -.04 -17.63 -.01 -3.69 -74.9 -.03 
PC-property -.47 -22.80 -.08 -3.35 -83.2 -.08 
PC-drug -.01 -1.09 .08 6.14 -788.0 .12 
PC-other -.02 -3.69 .02 4.54 -253.8 .24 
Pr commit -.09 -7.37 -.13 -8.49 46.0 -1.20 
Pr violations .24 21.52 .03 2.38 -85.6 .38 
Off sev score -17.65 -110.00 -.74 -4.75 -95.8 -.66 
Pr rec score -4.57 -32.83 -2.04 -12.41 -55.4 -.31 
 
Across each of the four interval comparisons, reduction in covariate 
differences from pre-adjustment to post-adjustment is considerable.  The 
pre-adjustment mean values are obtained by comparing the average for a 
given covariate in a given interval to the average of that covariate for all 
other intervals (i.e., percent male in interval 1 vs. percent male in the other 
intervals).  To test the balancing property requires, as Becker has 
emphasized, comparing “observed characteristics of units within a specific 
block of predicted transfer intensity [treatment] across groups of actual 
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[treatment].”120  Accordingly, the post-adjustment mean values are obtained 
by creating decile blocks within each treatment interval, based on the GPS 
score. Then, the specific algorithm in the gpscore.ado program involves 
comparing each interval-block to cases in all other “control” blocks—which 
are based on the GPS score—across the other three intervals.121 
Column 3 in table 3 presents the resulting mean difference 
comparisons, weighted to adjust for differences in the numbers of 
individuals in various blocks.  Because of the large number of comparisons, 
we present only the resulting mean difference comparisons, not the actual 
mean values.  As inspection of column 3 highlights, the mean differences 
are nearly zero across almost all of the covariates in each of the intervals.  
This pattern suggests that balance on covariates is achieved through the 
GPS adjustment. Inspection of column 4 highlights that the GPS adjustment 
in fact improved covariate balance.  In the vast majority of comparisons, for 
example, covariate differences across the intervals were reduced by 40% or 
more, which in turn contributes to the near-zero mean differences across the 
covariates, as shown in column 3. 
Even with the adjustment, some non-zero mean differences in several 
covariates (e.g., the offense severity score and the prior record score) 
remain, which may signal potential concern about imbalance. However, in 
these cases, the substantive difference in covariates is minor, as shown in  
column 5.  This column displays the percentage mean difference in 
covariates between a given interval and all other intervals after the GPS 
adjustment and taking into account the range of each covariate.  We focus 
here on the percentage mean differences because the large sample size 
results in large t-test values even when substantive mean differences are 
trivial.  Specifically, the percentage is calculated by dividing the post-
adjustment mean difference in a given covariate in a given interval as 
compared to the covariate mean in the other intervals by the range of a 
given variable.  It, thus, provides an indicator of the relative amount of 
variation remaining after adjustment, based on any given variable’s scale. 
For example, age, in interval 2, has a remaining post-adjustment mean 
difference of .36 years, as can be seen in column 3.  The range for age is 69 
(inmate ages ranged from 15 to 84).  Dividing the difference (.36) by the 
range (69) results in the percentage mean difference of .53, or a less than 
1% difference.  Notably, in 84% of the 92 covariate comparisons, the 
remaining difference in means was 2 percentage points or less of the 
original scale of the variables. In all others, the difference was less than 5% 
 
120  Becker et al., supra note 106, at 656 (emphasis omitted). 
121  Id. at 648, 656. 
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of the original scale. 
In short, the GPS adjustment resulted in time served group 
comparisons that appeared similar with respect to the covariates, thus 
reducing concern that any estimated effect of time served on recidivism was 
appreciably influenced by confounding. Even so, it bears emphasizing that 
bias due to unobservable confounding, which affects any quasi-
experimental assessment of time-served effects, still may persist.122 
Just as when conducting PSM analyses, attention to the common 
support area of treatment propensity when assessing treatment dosages 
helps to improve comparability of cases across levels of treatment and in 
turn the validity of treatment effect estimates. We imposed the common 
support condition by evaluating GPS values at median treatment intensities 
across deciles of time served and by excluding any cases in a given decile 
with an estimated propensity value beyond the range of values estimated for 
the control cases in the other nine deciles.123  For the full sample analysis, 
only sixty-five cases were found to be outside of the region of common 
support. 
The covariate balance achieved through the GPS adjustment sets the 
foundation for the second step of the GPS analyses—estimation of the 
outcome, recidivism, as a function of time served and the propensity score. 
Table 4 presents this model.  Logistic regression analysis is used to predict 
recidivism using time served, the GPS, quadratic specifications of each, and 
the interaction of time served and the GPS. Following Bia and Mattei, other 
polynomial specifications were investigated, but this model provided the 
best fit.124  Hirano and Imbens emphasized that “there is no direct meaning 
to the estimated coefficients in [the GPS model].”125  However, statistically 
significant GPS coefficients, as in table 4, indicate that the scores and 
procedure are useful and needed in removing potential bias.126 
  
 
122  Snodgrass et al., supra note 7, at 1166. 
123  See generally Becker et al., supra note 106; Bia et al., supra note 106 (detailing this 
approach). 
124  Bia & Mattei, supra note 104, at 359. 
125  Hirano & Imbens, supra note 106, at 82. 
126  Kluve et al., supra note 106, at 605. 
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Table 4.  Logistic Regression Generalized Propensity Score Analysis 
Predicting Recidivism 
 
 B   S.E. 
Time served .0250*** (.002) 
Time served x time served -.0003*** (.000) 
Generalized propensity score (GPS) -1.9418*** (.178) 
GPS x GPS -.9883*** (.201) 
Time served x GPS -.0614*** (.002) 
Constant -.4995*** (.039) 
   
Log likelihood = -61,532.419   
Pseudo R-squared = .014   
*** p < .001 
 
The final step involves specifying a second regression model that 
specifies the conditional expectation of recidivism given the estimated GPS 
and observed treatment intensity (i.e., time served), with standard errors and 
confidence intervals generated through bootstrapping.127  The predicted 
recidivism values for different values of time served result in a distribution 
of predicted probabilities referred to as a dose-response function.  Figure 1 
displays the resulting dose-response curve from the GPS analyses; the y-
axis on the left presents the predicted probabilities of recidivism and the x-
axis displays values for time served.  The response curve and confidence 
intervals are shown.  The y-axis on the right presents the percentage 
distribution of cases across time served, as indicated by the bars. 
 
 
127  Bia & Mattei, supra note 104, at 359. 
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Figure 1.  Dose-Response Estimation of Effect of Time Served on 






Four distinct patterns warrant mention.  First, from 1 to 12 months, 
greater time served is associated with an increased probability of 
recidivism, rising from 38% to a peak of 51% at one year. Second, from 
13–24 months, greater time served is associated with a decreased 
probability of recidivism; the decrease levels off at approximately two 
years. At that point, the probability of recidivism is approximately 47%, 
below the peak probability of recidivism at one year but above the 
probability of recidivism associated with incarceration for terms of 
incarceration spanning one to six months. Third, this probability of 
recidivism then remains relatively level for incarceration terms of 25–60 
months (3–5 years). Fourth, for inmates serving approximately six years or 
more, the probability of recidivism slowly and monotonically declines. 
However, the error associated with this estimate increases as well, as 
reflected in the widening confidence intervals (95% level), in turn 
suggesting that inferences about time served effects past six years should be 
made with caution. This situation stems from the fact that fewer than 2% of 
inmates served prison terms of that length. In short, the results from figure 1 
indicate support for hypothesis 3b that an inverted U-shaped association 
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Several additional analyses reinforced this assessment. The first set 
revisited the GPS modeling after eliminating inmates who served six years 
or more. For inmates serving less than six years in prison, the inverted U-
shaped pattern remained. The second set examined whether the use of 
different modeling approaches—including logistic regression model 
estimation with a polynomial specification for time served,128 semi-
parametric and non-parametric GPS specifications, and generalized additive 
models (GAM)—identified a markedly different functional form from that 
shown here.129  They did not. Rather, they reinforced the GPS findings, 
including both the inverted U-shaped effect and the uncertainty associated 
with estimates of time-served effects among individuals serving more than 
six years in prison. 
Finally, a third set of analyses entailed repeating the GPS procedure 
for different inmate populations. As inspection of figure 2 highlights, a 
similar inverted U-shaped association emerged that is largely similar across 
demographic groups (i.e., age, sex, and race and ethnicity) and among 
inmates who previously were incarcerated versus those who were not. That 
is, for inmates with different records of prior commitments, different age 
groups; males and females; and whites, blacks, and Latinos, the pattern in 
figure 1 surfaces.  For each inmate group, greater time served initially is 
associated with increased recidivism, then it is associated with decreased 
recidivism, before tapering off to a relatively flat or slowly declining 
probability of recidivism. 
This up-down-tapering pattern reflects a markedly different probability 
of recidivism, by month, than that suggested by the overall base rate of 
recidivism for the 3-year post-release time span for each of the respective 
groups. The group-specific base recidivism rates were as follows: 0 prior 
commitments (38%), 1 prior commitment (48%), 2+ prior commitment 
(58.3%), males (47%), females (39%), age 23 or less (52%), age 24–29 
(48%), age 30–35 (48%), age 36–41 (47%), age 41 and older (37%), whites 
(37%), blacks (54%), and Latinos (38%). 
Although these base recidivism rates provide important information, 
they also obscure the fact that the estimated probability of recidivism 
associated with a given duration of incarceration varies greatly. For 
example, as can be seen in figure 1, among inmates incarcerated for one 
year—and as compared with inmates incarcerated for one month—the 
probability of recidivism increases by approximately 14% (from 
approximately 38 percent to 52%).  It then declines by approximately 6% 
 
128  See Appendix. 
129  See Bia et al., supra note 106. 
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from one year to two years (from 52% to 46%).  In figure 2, the magnitude 
of these up-then-down changes is largely similar across the various groups, 
with minor fluctuations evident. For example, among females, the decline 
in recidivism associated with going from one year of incarceration to two 
years of incarceration is more pronounced than it is for males. Also, for 
inmates age 41 and older, the magnitude of changes in the probability of 
offending associated with one month, one year, and two years of 
incarceration, respectively, is more muted than for other age groups. 
 
Figure 2.  Dose-Response Effect of Time Served on Recidivism, 
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The only group for which a departure from the inverted U-shaped 
pattern emerged was for individuals age 23 or younger. For this group, time 
served up to 2.5 years exerted a similar effect as it did for other groups on 
the probability of recidivism. Thereafter, however, greater amounts of time 
served were estimated to increase this probability. This pattern suggests that 
prison durations of three years or longer may be primarily criminogenic for 
younger inmates. The well-established age-crime curve—with offending 
rapidly escalating during adolescence and then rapidly declining during late 
adolescence and early young adulthood—might explain in part for this 
finding.130  Yet, it appears unlikely to do so because the main pattern of 
results for the 23-and-under inmates parallels that for the other age groups. 
For example, time served initially is associated with a greater likelihood of 
recidivism but then after approximately twelve months it is associated with 
a lower likelihood of recidivism.  Among younger inmates, the increase in 
recidivism associated with terms of incarceration longer than three years is 
anomalous relative to all other age groups.  It is anomalous, too, because an 
age-crime curve account anticipates that lengthier terms of incarceration for 
younger inmates would, if anything, be associated with more dramatic 
declines in recidivism than for other groups.  Precisely the opposite holds, 
 
130  See FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE 
POLICY, AND PREVENTION 4 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012) (describing 
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however, suggesting that for younger inmates, lengthy prison terms may be 
more criminogenic than for older inmates. Regardless, the fact that the main 
pattern of results held for all other age groups suggests that identified 
effects of time served do not appear likely to be influenced by confounding 
associated with age. 
CONCLUSION 
Incarceration constitutes one of the central instruments of punishment 
that can be used to achieve retribution and public safety.131  Lengthier 
prison stays have been viewed, at least by policymakers, as a 
straightforward extension of this logic.132  Such stays on the face of it 
appear to be more retributive and to create incapacitation and general 
deterrent effects.133  In addition, such stays can be anticipated to exert a 
specific deterrent effect on recidivism.134  As many scholars have 
highlighted, however, the theoretical logic for incarcerated individuals 
remains far from decided.135  Prison stays may be criminogenic, they may 
reduce offending, or they may vary in their effect, depending on the amount 
of time served and the balance of criminogenic and deterrent or 
rehabilitative experiences incurred during a prison stay.  The bulk of work 
to date suggests that time served in prison may exert mixed effects on 
recidivism, though more recent work suggests that the effect may be 
minimal.136  As reviews and studies have highlighted, it remains the case 
that few rigorous empirical assessments of the time served and recidivism 
relationship exist, and fewer still have assessed whether the relationship is 
curvilinear.137 
In response to this situation and to calls by scholars for studies that 
inform research on the effects of incarceration and, in particular, its 
influence on the reentry of inmates back into society, this study drew on 
prior scholarship to identify three sets of hypothesized relationships 
between time served and recidivism.  The analyses did not indicate that 
time served has no effect on recidivism.  Rather, they support the 
 
131  Mears et al., supra note 5, passim. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  See Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9.  See generally Mears 
et al., supra note 5. 
136  See, e.g., Cochran et al., supra note 3; Green & Winik, supra note 46; Loughran et 
al., supra note 9; Meade et al., supra note 53; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7. 
137  See generally Cochran et al., supra note 3; Green & Winik, supra note 44; Loughran 
et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., supra note 53; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7.   
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hypothesis that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between time 
served and recidivism, at least for inmates serving up to five to six years in 
prison.  This relationship surfaced using a variety of different statistical 
approaches and across different inmate populations.  In particular, the study 
identified: (1) an increasing effect of time served on recidivism for one-
year-or-less terms, (2) a decreasing effect of time served for incarceration 
terms of approximately 13 to 24 months, (3) no appreciable effect from 25 
to 60 months, though the level of recidivism was higher than that for 
individuals who served only a few months in prison, and (4) a possible, 
though highly uncertain, decreasing effect of incarceration terms of six 
years or more. 
Before turning to implications of the study, several limitations warrant 
discussion.  Although this study relied on a large sample of adult inmates, 
the fact remains that relatively few individuals experience stays in prison 
beyond six or more years.  Those that do may differ markedly from others 
who serve shorter sentences.  In this study, that problem surfaced and 
created instability in the estimated effects of serving lengthy prison terms.  
In addition, the focus on adults necessarily means that the results may not 
generalize to juveniles.  Youth incarcerated in juvenile correctional 
facilities may have experiences that differ from those of adults, and they 
typically will serve shorter stays.138  Also, although the study relied on 
matching variables recommended by and used in prior work, unobserved 
confounding may have biased the estimation of the functional form of the 
time served and recidivism relationship.  Accordingly, the results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
We turn then, to the study’s implications.  First, as anticipated by 
scholars, there may be no single effect of time served on recidivism.139  
That is, the effect of time served may be variable depending on the specific 
amount of time served.  This possibility holds particular relevance for 
interpreting prior empirical studies, many of which have estimated only 
linear effects.  Such studies may have averaged distinct patterns of time-
served effects. Some null effects, for example, may have been identified by 
failing to take into account the type of variable time-served effect that 
surfaced in this study. A similar problem attends to studies that have 
identified modest criminogenic effects. For example, a study that focused 
only on inmates serving up to two years in prison and that employed linear 
estimation specifications likely would conclude, if the findings in the 
 
138  See Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 718 (showing that youth typically served twelve 
months or less in confinement). 
139  See, e.g., CLEMMER, supra note 8; Abrams, supra note 3; Orsagh & Chen, supra note 
3; Snodgrass et al., supra note 7. 
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present study were to hold, that time served increases the probability of 
recidivism. Such a “finding” would misrepresent the actual time served and 
recidivism relationship. The present study, along with suggestive evidence 
in several recent works, suggests warrant for this concern.140  More 
empirical research that investigates the functional form of the time served 
and recidivism relationship and that simultaneously addresses potential 
confounding is needed.  This study employed measures typically used in 
recidivism studies.  Yet, unobserved confounding may have influenced the 
estimated effects and so the results should be interpreted with caution. 
Second, the uniformity of the time-served effect across different 
inmate groups suggests a parallel to the observation that Sampson and Laub 
have offered about desistance.141  Their analyses of the Gluecks’ data 
indicated that “general desistance processes” are at work for a diverse array 
of groups, including different categories of offenders.142  Similarly, the 
analyses here suggest that time served may have effects that arise through a 
generalized process.  That is, in contrast to the suggestion in some accounts 
that prison may exert highly heterogeneous effects for some groups, the 
underlying pattern may be one of highly similar effects.143  If so, the process 
may well be a complicated one that entails different theoretical 
mechanisms, such as those that involve deterrence, social bonds, social 
capital, social learning, and strain. 
Precisely because a wide range of theoretical mechanisms exist, it 
stands as noteworthy that a three-part generalized process nonetheless may 
exist.  Here, we speculate about this possibility.  (1) During the initial 
period of incarceration, criminogenic effects may accumulate rapidly.  For 
example, social bonds and social capital may rapidly deteriorate, social 
learning about criminal lifestyles may occur, and strain may be felt 
acutely.144  Deterrent effects may exist, but may be modest and 
overwhelmed by criminogenic first-year experiences and processes.145  The 
end result would be an increasingly greater risk of recidivism.  (2) After this 
period, inmates may adjust.  Social bonds and social capital may slowly be 
 
140  See, e.g., Loughran et al., supra note 9; Meade et al., supra note 53. 
141  Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters? Trajectories of Crime 
Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age 70, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 586, 586 (2003) (arguing that 
neglecting incarceration length in group-based trajectory models can distort results).  
142  Id.  
143  See generally Mears et al., supra note 5. 
144  See Orsagh & Chen, supra note 3, for a related discussion about how competing 
forces may be at play in producing nonlinear effects of time served on recidivism. 
145  Bruce A. Jacobs, Deterrence and Deterrability, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 417, 418 (2010) 
(introducing the concept of risk-sensitivity to understand how some offenders are more or 
less likely to reoffend). 
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restored or inmates may adapt to the losses that they have experienced.  
They may develop strategies for negotiating prison life and adapting to 
strain.146  Social learning processes may occur, but may be less pronounced 
in their influence.  Simultaneously, the intended deterrent effects of 
incarceration may increasingly take hold, as inmates increasingly 
experience or appreciate the “pains of imprisonment.”147  Not least, 
rehabilitative programming effects may begin to take hold.  The end result 
is a slowly decreasing risk of recidivism.  (3) Subsequently, time served 
effects may level off.  Social bonds and social capital may not be restored, 
but inmates may have well-developed strategies for coping with prison life.  
Deterrent effects remain but exist in an equilibrium relative to these 
countervailing forces.  As a result, additional incarceration neither increases 
nor decreases the likelihood of recidivism. 
Juxtaposed against this generalized process is the possibility that for 
some groups, such as the youngest inmates, the varying experiences 
throughout a prison stay may result in appreciably different, or even 
opposite, effects of time served.  In this study, among young adults who 
served more than three years in prison, longer prison stays were associated 
with increasing probabilities of recidivism; for other groups such stays were 
associated with decreasing probabilities of recidivism.  For younger 
individuals, disruptions to social bonds may be especially influential and so 
contribute to this differential effect.  With the data at hand, we cannot 
adjudicate among these possibilities.  The study findings, however, suggest 
warrant for investigating the potential for prison to exert substantially 
different effects for some groups than for others and for investigating the 
mechanisms that give rise to any such effects. 
Third, theoretical and empirical research on time served effects and 
desistance is needed.  Such work ideally will identify how changes in causal 
mechanisms throughout a given duration of incarceration unfold and 
accumulate, relative to one another, to result in a given likelihood of 
offending.  For developing and testing theoretical accounts of punishment 
and offending, such work is critical.  Strong theoretical grounds exist to 
anticipate a diverse range of effects of time served on recidivism.  Here, we 
find support for one pattern—an increasing, decreasing, and then relatively 
monotonic effect of time served on recidivism. 
A critical question for future research, however, is how different causal 
mechanisms in prison contribute to this type of pattern.  Such work will 
 
146  See Adams, supra note 61, for a related discussion about how inmates, over time, 
may adapt to prison and how that may affect their behavior. 
147  See SYKES, supra note 4. 
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require developing measures of in-prison experiences, including changes in 
social bonds, social capital, social learning processes conducive to criminal 
or prosocial behavior, strains, and perceptions that would contribute to 
deterrent effects.148  Attention to modeling conditions of confinement also 
will be important.  Custody levels, programming, restrictions, officer-
inmate relations, reentry preparation, administrative practices all may 
contribute to the effect of prison and, by extension, the duration of 
incarceration.149  Future research ideally not only will continue to 
investigate the effect of time served on recidivism but also will incorporate 
additional covariates to address potential confounding.  Ideally, studies will 
also use a range of measures of recidivism, including self-reported 
offending, to ensure that estimated effects of time served are not influenced 
by the measure used.150  Not least, research should be undertaken that 
examines the effect of time served for felons sentenced only to jail terms.  
For such research, the primary question is whether differences exist in the 
effect of 1 month to 12 months, given that most jail terms entail one year or 
less of incarceration.  Jail experiences and contexts may differ from those in 
prison, and in turn they may result in different effects of time served, even 
when the focus is on 12 months or less of time. 
Fourth, the results of this study suggest that lengthier terms of 
incarceration, beyond a few months, do not readily appear to reduce 
recidivism and, indeed, may increase it.  The analyses here suggest that one 
year of incarceration may result in an approximately 10% increase or more 
in the probability of offending when compared to one month of 
incarceration.  The probability of recidivism associated with two years of 
incarceration, however, appears to be approximately 5% less than that 
associated with one year of incarceration.  For one year or two years of 
incarceration, however, the net effect of incarceration appears to be 
criminogenic when compared to shorter stays of one to six months.  
Lengthier prison terms of three years or more do not appear to appreciably 
reduce recidivism beyond that associated with shorter prison stays.  
Whether these effects are higher or lower than what would occur if inmates 
were given non-incarceration sanctions was not addressed in this study.  
 
148  See Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Apel, A Signaling Perspective on Employment-
Based Reentry Programming: Training Completion as a Desistance Signal, 11 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 21, 42–45 (2012) (asserting that desistance is better achieved by 
using multidimensional programs to address prisoners’ diverse array of needs); MAY & 
WOOD, supra note 40; Bushway & Owens, supra note 42. See generally Paternoster, supra 
note 22. 
149  See generally Mears et al., supra note 5. 
150  See, e.g., Ostermann et al., supra note 95 (showing that how recidivism is 
operationalized may affect estimates of the effects of punishments). 
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However, recent reviews and studies suggest that incarceration either exerts 
little influence or may be criminogenic.151 
Such findings should not be construed as an argument against lengthy 
prison sentences.  For example, such sentences may be justified as helping 
to achieve retributive goals or to create general deterrent benefits that offset 
harms that arise through potential increased recidivism among inmates.  
The findings warrant consideration of greater reliance on shorter prison 
stays of less than one year.  For example, the Pew Charitable Trusts 
undertook a study that suggested that 14–24 percent of inmates in three 
study states could have served shorter prison terms with no adverse effect 
on recidivism.152  Whether doing so would adversely affect either society’s 
sense that retribution somehow has been achieved is unknown; it is also 
unknown how much doing so would affect the amount of public safety 
gains that arise from incapacitation or general deterrence.  What is known, 
however, is that quantifying retribution does not constitute a 
straightforward or even possible task and that lengthy terms of confinement 
may not be required to generate appreciable general deterrent effects.153 
Research ideally will clarify how the goal of retribution might be achieved 
and whether, if at all, approaches to retribution might be tied to those 
approaches that best promote public safety. 
Finally, there is a need to investigate and address potential 
criminogenic effects of incarceration.  Prison may provide a specific 
deterrent or rehabilitative effect.  However, this benefit may be offset by 
experiences in prison that make a return to society difficult and increase 
reoffending.154  Accordingly, efforts to promote prison experiences that 
directly build on insights from criminological theory and research may be 
beneficial.  For instance, prisons that rely on practices and programs that 
emphasize the development of social bonds, social capital, and prosocial 




151  See, e.g., Cochran et al., supra note 3; Green & Winik, supra note 46; Nagin et al., 
Imprisonment and Reoffending, supra note 9. 
152  See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 36. 
153  See generally Bushway & Owens, supra note 42; Cochran et al., supra note 3; 
Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 2; Paternoster, supra note 22. 
154  See PETERSILIA, supra note 24, passim; TRAVIS, supra note 2, passim. 
155  See generally LATESSA ET AL., supra note 1; MEARS & COCHRAN, supra note 25. 
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Appendix.  Logistic Regression of Recidivism on Time Served and 
Covariates 
 
 Odds Ratio B S.E. 
Time served (months) 1.035*** .035*** (.008) 
Time served (months)2 .998*** -.002*** (.000) 
Time served (months)3 1.00003*** .000*** (.000) 
Time served (months)4 .99999*** -.000*** (.000) 
Male (1/0) 1.374*** .318*** (.030) 
Black (1/0)a 1.638*** .493*** (.018) 
Latino (1/0)a 1.030 .029 (.036) 
Age (years) .964*** -.037*** (.001) 
Primary offense (PO)–murder (1/0)b .618*** -.482*** (.076) 
Primary offense (PO)–sex crime (1/0)b .637*** -.450*** (.053) 
Primary offense (PO)–robbery (1/0)b 1.131*** .123*** (.035) 
Primary offense (PO)–other violent (1/0)b .884*** -.123*** (.027) 
Primary offense (PO)–burglary (1/0)b 1.253*** .226*** (.026) 
Primary offense (PO)–property (1/0)b 1.148*** .138*** (.028) 
Primary offense (PO)–weapons (1/0)b .898* -.107* (.045) 
Primary offense (PO)–other (1/0)b 1.150*** .140*** (.034) 
Prior convictions (PC)–violent (count) .467*** -.762*** (.017) 
Prior convictions (PC)–sex crime (count) .338*** -1.086*** (.067) 
Prior convictions (PC)–property (count) .731*** -.313*** (.006) 
Prior convictions (PC)–drug (count) .632*** -.459*** (.010) 
Prior convictions (PC)–other (count) .660*** -.415*** (.022) 
Prior prison commitments (count) 1.268*** .237*** (.008) 
Prior supervision violations (count) 1.325*** .281*** (.008) 
Offense severity score (continuous) .988*** -.012*** (.001) 
Prior record score (continuous) 1.012*** .012*** (.001) 
Year dummy variablesc —— —— —— 
Judicial circuit dummy variablesc —— —— —— 
Constant 1.786*** .580*** (.104) 
    
R-squared = .247    
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
a.  “White” serves as the reference category. 
b.  “Primary offense (PO)–drugs” serves as the reference category. 
c.  Year and judicial circuit dummy variables were included in the model but are 
not shown here to conserve space (coefficient and standard error estimates 
available upon request). 
